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REPORT TO THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

January 20, 1972
By: Robert E. Sullivan

My name is Robert E. Sullivan. I am Dean of the Law School at the University of

Montana. Since 1942 1 have been licensed to practice lay in Montana. I have also been
licensed to practice law in Oliio and in North Dakota. I appear here to testify in favor of
the proposed Judicial Article submitted by the Montana Citizens for Court Improvement.
It is also known as tlie MontanacPlan.

An essential element of the Montana Plan is the selection and retention of judges on
the basis of merit. A history and discussion of the various ways of selecting judges, and
the advantages and disadvantages of each method, are explored fully in Report #14, The

Judiciary, prepared by the Montana Constitutional Convention Commission. There is no

need to repeat that material here but a careful reading of it is important to gain an under
standing of the inadequacies of the present system of selecting and retaining judges in

Montana.

Any method of judicial selection and retention must be based upon the objective of
establishing a strong and independent judiciary--strong in the sense that judges must be
competent, impartial and courageous; independent in the sense that judges must be honest

and humble--free of outside influences and sensitive to the great responsibility they bear.
The Montana Plan is designed to provide greater ssurance that Montana judges will continue

to be honest, impartial, competent, courageous and humble. These attributes exist in

Montana judges presently, not because of the system of judicial selection, but in spite of it.
However, under the pretense that the law and judges should be more responsive, there are
increasing pressures to make judges subordinate and subject to the influence of political

and other power groups. This can lead only to destruction of the objectivity and impartiality
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of judges and to disrespect and disobedience of the law.

The present system of selecting judges in Montana does not achieve its objective of
public participation in the initial choice of judges. Of the five justices of the Montana

Supreme Court, four were appointed by the Governor. They have been retained in office
by subsequent elections but in many of the elections they have had no opposition. Where
is the choice of the electorate under such a system? Of the twenty-eight district court
judges, twenty of them became judges by appointment of the Governor, and again they

have been returned to office--with few exceptions--in subsequent elections where they have
had no opposition. There is no choice in the electorate. Under such a system, the public
can register opposition to an incumbent judge only by refraining from casting a vote for him.
And that does not register any audible dissent. Under the appointive-elective system in

effect in Montana currently, there is no limitation on the discretion of the appointing authority-

the Governor. It is a tribute to Montana Governors and to incumbent judges that the system
has worked at all. We cannot expect that it will continue to operate with even minimal success.
Section 13 of the Montana Plan provides for:

... a nonpartisan Judicial Council composed of members divided equally
between the judiciary, the bar and the public. The Legislature shall provide
the numbers, qualifications and method of selection. ’’

This Council consistsof aNominating Committee and a Research and Qualifications Committee.
The Nominating Committee is the basic component of merit selection of judges. It is com
posed of members of ’’he public and of lawyers. The majority must be members of the

public and no members of the executive, legislative or judicial branches of government may
serve on the committee. The committee screens all announced and unannounced potential
judge nominees and recommends not less than two nor more than four to the Governor who

must fill the judicial vacancy from that list. In comparison to the present system of
selection in Montana, the Montana Plan imposes limitations on the unlimited discretion of
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the Governor in making judicial appointments and provides initial public participation
in the selection process. Merit selection has worked well in other states. It has

attracted outstanding lawyers to the Bench who were not available nor interested under

the partisan or nonpartisan elective process but who welcomed voter evaluation of their
competence and performance as a judge after they had served a probationary period.

The other element of merit selection is periodic accountability to the electorate
at the polls. At the end of a term to be fixed by the Legislature, the appointed judge

must run against his record in an uncontested general election on a nonpartisan ballot.

Some critics of tlx; plan characterize this as meaningless and as a sham. In comparison
to existing afiairs in Montana, it gives the electorate a choice they do not have currently

where incumbent judges are unopposed for election. If the only choice is not to vote, it
is no choice at all. If the performance of an incumbent judge is criticized by a strong

vote of disapproval, it will be a great stimulus for humility and better performance-
objectives that proponents of popular election of judges stress as arguments for retaining
the present Montana system.

Thus the Montana Plan under Section 13 of the Proposed Judicial Article provides
for merit selection by a committee representative of the public, appointment by the
Governor from a list of qualified prospects and periodic evaluation by the electorate

with the opportunity for approval or rejection with consequent retention or removal from

office. In the latter event, the selection process is activated to fill the vacancy created
by the public in removing an incumbent judge from office.

Even under the present appointive-elective system in Montana, it is possible that
there may be selected a person who becomes an arrogant, incompetent judge. No method
of judicial selection will remove this possibility. Under the elective system, tlic supposition

-4is tint such a judge will lx? turned out of office at the next election. This is not always

the case, if there is a noncontested election, there is no way for the electorate to exercise this
prerogative. Moreover, the electorate may not know of the shortcomings of the judge and
the history of incumbent judges seeking re-election, whether nationally or in Montana,

demonstrates that an incumbent judge rarely loses in a campaign for re-election.
The Montana Plan seeks to remedy this deficiency in the present Montana system by a
committee of tlte Judicial Council--the Research and Qualifications Committee. In the exercise
of its qualifications function, this committee has:
. . . the power to investigate, upon complaint by any citizen or on its
own motion, charges which would be the basis for retirement, censure,
or removal of any justice,judge or magistrate.

Members of this committee may also lie members of the Nominating Committee but a majority

must be judges and lawyers and a minority must be members of the public. This is similar
to the removal techniques developed in other states.

The number of arrogant, incompetent

irresponsible or dishonest judges is small--as indicated by the number of judges removed

from office under this process in other states. But there must oe a method of removal

provided, even in the absence of merit selection, if the good order and well being of society
is to be preserved. Impeachment is not a realistic approach. Neither is the vote of the

electorate in the type of cases that are not publicized. The procedure of the committee

specified in Section 13 of the Montana Plan is designed to protect the good name of a judge
complained against or being investigated until the charges are substantiated in which event

retirement, censure or removal from office may be ordered. Judges must be impeccable
in their conduct and always subject to question in terms of their judicial attributes--honesty,

impartiality, competence, courage and humility. The Montana Plan provides a method of

continuing restraint.
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There are several other provisions in the Montana Han that relate to selection and
retention but they are found in other sections of the Proposed Judicial Article. In Section 17,
incumbent Supreme Court Justices and district court judges are continued in office as

though selected initially under the merit plan--but subject to removal in an election

at the end of their term when they must run against their record as a judge. They are

also subject to removal, retirement or censure as provided under Section 13 dealing
with the operation of the Research and Qualifications Committee. Police judges and justices

of the peace continue to hold office and perform their judicial functions until the end of

the term for which they have been elected, at which time their jurisdiction and records
are transferred to the district court.

Under Section 9 magistrates are selected by the district judge with the approval of the
Supreme Court. Under Section 7, the clerk of the Supreme Court is appointed by that Cour

and under Section 11 clerks of the district court shall be appointed for each county by the

judge or judges of the district. The trend nationally is to substitute appointive clerks for
elective clerks in order to provide for greater efficiency in the operation of the judicial

system and to place the responsibility for immediate supervision of the work of the trial

courts--both the magistrates and the clerks--where it belongs, in the district judge with

whom and under whom these officials must work.
CONCLUSION

What is a judge? Why is the manner in which judges are selected and retained so

important? The answers to those questions are found in the very nature of our free,
democratic society. Twin pillars of that society are that we live under a rule of law and
not of men and that freedom will flourish where there is voluntary compliance with the law.
The threat of punishment or the expectation of reward are insufficient to sustain voluntary

compliance with the law over a long period of time. There must be acceptance of the ideal
that voluntary compliance with the law contributes to the good ordei' and well being of all
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society and is important for these reasons alone, without any threat of punishment or any
expectation of reward. What a judge is and what a judge does demonstrates to the public

the operation of law, contributes to the public attitude of whether to have respect for and

obey the law, and ultimately determines the extent of lawlessness in society. We can ill
afford a system that may attract or allow the retention of inadequate judges. The Montana
Plan of merit selection and retention is designed to avoid this catastrophe.

